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In this paper, I argue for a version of panpsychist idealism on first-person experiential 
grounds. As things always appear in my field of consciousness, there is prima facie 
empirical support for idealism. Furthermore, by assuming that all things correspond to 
a conscious perspective or perspectives (i.e., panpsychism), realism about the world is 
arguably safeguarded without the need to appeal to God (as per Berkeley’s idealism). 
Panpsychist idealism also has a phenomenological advantage over traditional 
panpsychist views as it does not commit perceptual experience to massive error by 
denying that perceived colours are properties of things. Finally, I argue that the subject 
combination problem for panpsychism has been motivated by the problematic 
assumption that consciousness is in things. Thinking about subject combination from 
the first-person perspective is fruitful for reframing the subject combination problem 


















Panpsychism has been gaining ground in recent times as an alternative to 
physicalism (Chalmers, 2015; Goff, 2017; Mørch, 2014; Strawson, 2006). The main 
motivation for panpsychism has been that it provides an answer to the hard problem of 
consciousness. There is nothing in neuroscience that predicts the arising of conscious 
experience. Any particular brain function it seems could be performed equally well 
without any consciousness: So why should consciousness be needed at all? David 
Chalmers (1996, 2010) formalises this intuition in the conceivability argument. We can 
conceive of physical and functional duplicates of ourselves who are phenomenal 
zombies. They act just as we do, have the same physical constitution, and their physical 
states perform all of the same functions, and yet there is nothing it is like to be them. 
This argument aims to demonstrate that there is no necessary connection between 
standard physical properties and phenomenal qualities, hence phenomenal qualities 
cannot be reduced to physical properties, but must instead be fundamental.1 
The hard problem of consciousness motivates dualism about consciousness in 
which both physical and mental properties are fundamental, but not identical 
(Chalmers, 1996). However, dualism suffers from the problem of causal exclusion. It 
is highly intuitive that mental states have causal effects. For instance, the feeling of 
scorching pain causes my arm to move away from the fire. However, the reactions of 
my nervous system to the heat seem to be all that it needed to explain why I moved my 
arm, which apparently makes non-physical properties redundant to the causal 
explanation (Kim, 1998). The background assumption is that an effect cannot have two 
sufficient causes except in rare cases such as a window being broken by being hit by a 
rock and a cricket ball at exactly the same time. However, dualism seems to entail either 
systematic causal overdetermination or that mental states are epiphenomenal. The 
promise of avoiding both the hard problem and causal overdetermination is a strong 
motivation for panpsychism (Chalmers, 2015). 
 
1‘Physicalism’ which I use interchangeably with ‘materialism’ is the view that fundamental reality is 
wholly physical (e.g., Goff, 2017, p. 23). Galen Strawson (2006a) refers to Russellian panpsychism as a 
type of physicalism (Real Physicalism), as physicalism technically remains true. This, however, is a 
controversial move, as physicalists usually assume that fundamental matter is non-mental. I will be 
assuming here that materialism is the view that fundamental reality is wholly physical and wholly non-
mental. By contrast, idealism is the view that fundamental reality is wholly mental. I clarify the 
differences between idealist and materialist versions of panpsychism in section 2. 
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In many versions of panpsychism, at least some fundamental matter has 
phenomenal properties. We can call this family of views ‘panpsychist materialism’. 
Russellian panpsychism falls in this category. Russellian panpsychism, for example, 
attempts to solve the hard problem of consciousness by proposing that phenomenal 
properties are the intrinsic properties of fundamental matter. Since phenomenal 
properties are fundamental, there is no question of how they arise from non-experiential 
phenomena.2 Furthermore, since phenomenal properties are the intrinsic nature of 
matter it arguably does not suffer from the problem of the causal exclusion faced by 
dualism (Chalmers, 2015).  
Unfortunately, this apparently promising approach has its own ‘hard problem’ 
of explaining how the micro-experiences of my fundamental components constitute my 
macro-experience. This is the combination problem for panpsychism (Chalmers, 2016). 
Given this stumbling block for traditional versions of panpsychism, it is 
worthwhile investigating an alternative that has been rather neglected in contemporary 
philosophy—panpsychist idealism.3 While panpsychist materialism begins with the 
bold hypothesis that phenomenal properties are the intrinsic nature of matter, 
panpsychist idealism begins with the phenomenological observation that, on the 
contrary, things are always presented in the field of consciousness. There is no 
observational evidence that consciousness is actually a hidden ‘inner’ property of 
things. No one has ever opened up a brain, or cut open a cell, or broken apart a molecule 
and found consciousness in there. For the idealist, the reason for this is rather obvious. 
Brains and other material objects are appearances in the field of consciousness and so 
cannot themselves be the bearers of that consciousness. Materialism, and common 
sense for that matter, invert the way that we experience the world.  
Both materialism and panpsychist materialism hold that human consciousness 
is in brains, which are objects in physical space. By contrast, idealism reverses this 
 
2 See Bolender (2001) for an argument that this Russellian move itself already implies idealism. 
3 For recent versions of panpsychist idealism see Albahari (2019, 2020), Harding (1998), Sprigge 
(1983). Hoffman (2008) presents a close relative of panpsychist idealism in which reality is composed 
of a network of interacting conscious agents, but he denies that this is panpsychism because not all 
things correspond to a conscious perspective. However, this is also the case for most panpsychists in 
that tables and chairs are not conscious (Griffin, 1998). The main difference seems to be that Hoffman 
takes objects to be icons for conscious agents that are often very different to the underlying reality. 
Hence the network of conscious agents does not necessarily correspond to the way things are 
presented. Atoms, molecules and cells, may or may not correspond to conscious agents. This being 
said, as reality is ultimately a network of conscious subjects (many of them not corresponding to 
organisms), this view could count as a version of panpsychist idealism as I understand it. 
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view, holding that brains and spatial properties are in the field of consciousness. This 
key difference leads to phenomenological and epistemological divergences between the 
views. The materialist assumption that phenomenal properties are in things creates a 
separation between the experiences of objects and the objects themselves. This 
assumption seems to strip physical objects of their sensible qualities, which I hold leads 
to phenomenological and epistemological disadvantages for panpsychist materialism 
that do not affect idealism.     
Furthermore, the unquestioned notion that consciousness is in things, I will 
claim, is also at the heart of the combination problem for panpsychism. It is difficult to 
see how subjects could combine when they are imagined as hidden ghostly presences 
trapped inside things. However, from the first-person perspective my field of 
consciousness does not seem to be bounded by a thing, or so I claim. Approaching the 
subject of experience from the first-person perspective, as idealists do, has the potential 
to shift our understanding on this issue.  
The motivation of this article is hence to provide phenomenological arguments 
for idealism. The approach uses phenomenology as a guide to metaphysics in 
combination with taking seriously the findings of the sciences. Such an approach, which 
can be referred to as ‘analytic phenomenology’, is beginning to be defended and taken 
up by some philosophers (Goff, 2017, chapter 10; Ramm, 2017; Siewert, 2016; 
Strawson, 2009; Velmans, 2000).4 In my view, this science-inspired approach which 
takes seriously our phenomenological data is one of the surest methods for avoiding the 
possibility that when we do metaphysics, we are merely playing games with words.5 
Why use phenomenology as a guide to metaphysics? Since first-person experience is a 
basic form of evidence (Goldman, 2004), we do not need to justify the assumption that 
experience can show the nature of the world. Beginning with the way things are given, 
is simply more scientific than ignoring this evidence or dismissing it. The assumption 
is not that this evidence is infallible, but that it provides prima facie, defeasible 
justification for metaphysical claims. The burden of proof, I claim, is on the objector 
who wants to disregard the first-person evidence. 
 
4 The use of first-person methods is controversial in philosophy and psychology. Critiques of the 
reliability of first-person methods have been made by Dennett (1991), Irvine (2012), Piccinini (2010), 
Schwitzgebel (2011). For defences against common objections see Ramm (2016, 2018). 
5 On the apparent lack of progress of contemporary analytic metaphysics see Bennett (2009), Goff 




In this paper, I will present phenomenological arguments for panpsychist 
idealism which draw upon the work of Douglas Harding (1998).6 Harding was a non-
academic philosopher and mystic whose central philosophical work ‘The Hierarchy of 
Heaven and Earth’ was first published in the 1950’s (Harding, 1952). His work 
anticipates some of the contemporary arguments for panpsychism and idealism, but has 
so far received little attention from philosophers. As panpsychist idealism is a relatively 
unexplored view in contemporary philosophy, here I can only provide an initial sketch 
of some of its features and how it relates to other views.7 
The plan for the paper is as follows. In section 2, I outline Harding’s version of 
panpsychist idealism and contrast it with panpsychist materialism. In section 3, I 
provide a phenomenological argument for panpsychist idealism. I will also argue that 
the panpsychist component of the theory is consistent with scientific realism, and hence 
it avoids the main problems of subjective idealism. In section 4, I discuss the advantages 
of idealism when it comes to accounting for colours and in knowing the world. In 
section 5, I aim to show how approaching the subject combination problem from the 
first-person perspective reframes the problem and provides a new way of conceiving 
how subjects could potentially combine. 
 
2. Panpsychist Idealism 
 
 In this section, I outline a system of panpsychist idealism developed by Douglas 
Harding (1998). I then identify three key metaphysical differences between panpsychist 
idealism and panpsychist materialism. In the rest of the paper, I will provide a 
motivation for this metaphysics and contrast it with opposing views, particularly 





6 I will provide citations whenever I am directly using Harding’s arguments. The rest of the paper 
represents my own endeavours to apply these ideas to contemporary problems and to flesh out his 
arguments in more detail. For instance, the phenomenological argument for panpsychist idealism in 
section 2 is my own argument inspired by his first-person observations and empiricist principles. 
7 In the West, historical proponents of versions of panpsychist idealism (usually though not always 
combined with a cosmic subject or ‘absolute’), tentatively include Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1714), 
Arthur Schopenhauer (1844), Josiah Royce (1899-1901), F. H. Bradley (1893), and James Ward (1911) 
whom has been almost entirely forgotten by philosophers. See Skrbina (2005) for a historical overview. 
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2.1 Outline of a System of Panpsychist Idealism 
 
The current approach to panpsychist idealism draws upon Douglas Harding’s 
Hierarchy of Heaven and Earth (1998) which was originally published as an abridged 
version in 1952 (Harding, 1952). In this work, Harding presents a systematic integration 
of the Perennial Philosophy and the scientific world view.8 This is a sophisticated 
system that I cannot do justice to here. However, some key elements of this system 
include: 
 
1. Reality consists of a network of interacting observers that exist only by 
reflecting each other’s appearances. 
2. Observers are not atomistic, rather they overlap. 
3. How a thing manifests depends upon the range from which it is observed. 
4. There is a central ‘Nothingness’ which is the origin and ground of all things. 
5. This ‘Nothingness’ is the inside story of all beings and is directly 
experienceable.9 
 
This version of panpsychism is like Leibniz’s Monadology, except that there is 
genuine causal interaction between subjects. Other differences from Leibniz include 
that subjects are not atomistic, rather they are co-dependent (they cannot exist without 
one another) (point 1) and unlike Leibniz, perspectives also overlap (point 2). I will 
focus on points 1 and 2 in this paper.  
Douglas Harding proposes that we take experience exactly as it is given; that is, 
his methodology is in the tradition of William James’ ‘radical empiricism’ (James, 
1976). He observes that from my first-person perspective I cannot see my head. What 
I am looking out of is gap-like rather than thing-like. Furthermore, unlike ordinary gaps 
like the gap of an open doorway, this ‘gap’ or ‘nothingness’ from which I am looking 
is not in anything (it has no frame), that is, it is unbounded (Ramm, 2021, p.7). 
However, this opening is not a mere nothing because it is filled with the visual scene 
 
8 The ‘Perennial Philosophy’ was coined by Aldous Huxley (1946) to refer the mysticism common to 
many religious traditions that: (A) The inner-most Reality of all beings transcends space, time and 
causation and (B) this fundamental reality is directly experienceable by humans. Miri Albahari (2019, 
2020) refers to this reality as an aperspectival unconditioned consciousness that grounds all things. 
9 By ‘Nothingness’ Harding is not referring to mere non-existence, but to a qualityless, spaceless, 
timeless ground of the universe (e.g., Harding, 1998, p. 108). In later work, he uses ‘Nothingness’ 
interchangeably with ‘Awareness’ and ‘Consciousness’ (e.g., Harding, 1992, p, 44). 
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(Harding, 1986, p. 2). These phenomenological observations will become important in 
section 5 when I discuss how subjects could conceivably combine for the idealist. 
What am I like for others? Once again taking a phenomenological approach, 
Harding (1998) observed that how I manifest to others depends upon the range of the 
observer. For example, I appear as a human from a few metres away and at closer ranges 
as cells, molecules, atoms, particles, to virtually nothing at centre (zero distance).10  
From further ranges, I appear as a city (such as when viewed from an airplane), a planet 
(such as when viewed from the Moon), a star (such as when viewed from Alpha 
Centauri), a galaxy (when viewed from another galaxy.11 A thing then is the totality of 
its appearances to other observers at all ranges. Furthermore, all things are two sided.12 
There is no view into a centre without a view out (or views out), hence the system is 
thoroughly panpsychist. 
That for an approaching observer, I seem to become less and less thing-like, 
until I am mostly empty space, Harding takes as confirmation that the ‘nothingness’ 
that I am looking out of is my fundamental reality (Harding, 1998). In fact, this is the 
innermost nature of all beings. As this central nothingness is directly experienceable, 
his system is a version of the Perennial Philosophy. I set aside investigating his 
arguments for this mystical hypothesis for another time. Here I focus on the relevance 
of his approach to contemporary theories of panpsychism.  
In this system, subjects cannot exist independently of each other. Rather 
subjects exist in networks in which they reflect the appearances of other subjects. They 
do not exist when there is nothing to reflect (they are nothing in themselves). He refers 
to my capacity to reflect the world with the term ‘reflection’. However, perception is 
 
10 Here ‘appear’ is used in a broad sense to include the cognitive and imaginative experience, since we 
don’t actually see or feel atoms and particles. 
11 How observers can be understood to be located at different ranges or distances from each other is 
potentially problematic on an idealist account, since subjects/perspectives themselves are not located 
‘in’ an objective physical space. My interpretation of Harding is that space is intersubjectively 
constituted. As all observers are two sided, they will appear as objects that are positioned at a particular 
distance from each other for other observers. From the third-person perspective, observers are also 
standard objects that appear to move through space. However, from the first-person perspective, me 
moving closer or further away from an object is partly recognised by changes in the appearance of the 
object itself (e.g., Harding, 1998, p. 13). For example, it looks bigger or smaller, and more or less detail 
can be distinguished etc. To say then that how things manifest depends upon the range of observation 
can be cashed out as a systematic correspondence between (1) how far two observers A and B 
appear/can be measured from each other for observers C, D, E... and (2) how observers A and B appear 
to each other, and vice versa. I cannot give a fully-fledged account of intersubjective space for idealism 
here nor assess how compatible it is with current physical theories of space. 
12 The notion that all things are two sided is similar to that of Bertrand Russell (1927) that all things 
have an extrinsic physical nature and an intrinsic mental nature. 
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not an entirely passive process, since what is reflected here at my centre is projected as 
over there. For example, I see how another subject appears at three metres away, such 
as a human appearance. However, I project them as being over there (not as residing 
here where I am). Furthermore, imagery is regularly projected which does not 
correspond to others’ perspectives such as hallucinations, illusions and dreams. All 
perception is in fact creative. The difference between phantoms (dreams, 
hallucinations, illusions) and everyday perceptual experiences is a difference in degree 
rather than kind. The latter are projected by fewer subjects in the network and are less 
systematic and coherent and hence ‘less real’ while the latter are projected by more 
subjects and are more systematic and coherent and hence ‘more real’ (Harding, 1998, 
chapter 3).13 
This theory in its broad outline echoes that of the ancient Buddhist metaphor of 
Indra’s Net:      
 
Far away in the heavenly abode of the great god Indra, there is a wonderful net  
which has been hung by some cunning artificer in such a manner that it stretches 
out infinitely in all directions. In accordance with the extravagant tastes of 
deities, the artificer has hung a single glittering jewel in each ‘eye’ of the net, 
and since the net itself is infinite in dimension, the jewels are infinite in number. 
There hang the jewels, glittering like stars in the first magnitude, a wonderful 
sight to behold. If we now arbitrarily select one of these jewels for inspection 
and look closely at it, we will discover that in its polished surface there are 
reflected all the other jewels in the net, infinite in number. Not only that, but 
each of the jewels reflected in this one jewel is also reflecting all the other 
jewels, so that there is an infinite reflecting process occurring. (Cook, 1977, p. 
2)  
 
Indra’s Net provides an illustration of the Buddhist theory of the 
interdependence of all phenomena. Things are ‘empty’ in that they do not have a 
 
13 Albahari (2019) presents a very similar view of panpsychist idealism. Rather than ‘reflection’ and 
‘projection’ she refers to the disposition for a subject to appear to other subjects as particular 
cognisensory object imagery (outer dispositions) and the disposition of a subject to experience other 
subjects based upon its own particular nature (inner dispositions). In this sense, the dispositions are co-
dependent and how subjects manifest to each other will depend upon the particular ‘disposition 
partners’ (Albahari, 2019, p. 38-40). See also Albahari (2020). 
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separate self-existence. Thich Naht Hanh (1998) explains the Buddhist notion of 
emptiness in terms of ‘inter-being’. This avoids the nihilist interpretation that the 
emptiness of the self simply means that the self does not exist. The Buddha sought a 
middle way between separate substantial selves and nihilism or the non-existence of 
the self. The notion of inter-being is a useful way of understanding emptiness, while 
avoiding the mistake of taking the doctrine of non-self to be eliminativism about the 
self. 
If we further stipulate that the jewels in the story are conscious observers, then 
the result is a version of thorough-going panpsychism. However, the subjects are not 
substances or souls in the traditional sense because they cannot exist independently of 
each other. Rather, they are nodes in a network. There are no nodes without the network 
in which they are embedded. Take away the network and there are no nodes. Neither is 
there a network without nodes. 
 
2.2 Distinguishing Idealist and Materialist Versions of Panpsychism 
 
Having provided an outline of a system of panpsychist idealism, we are now in 
a position to contrast it with panpsychist materialism as follows:  
 
(1) For idealism things are observer-dependent, while for materialism they are 
observer-independent.  
(2) For idealism experiences are properties of subjects, while for materialism 
experiences are properties of matter.  
(3) Idealism is subject-centred, while materialism is object-centred.  
 
As both reductive materialism and traditional panpsychism are on the same side 
for all three points and against idealism on these same points, this provides a motivation 
for distinguishing between idealist and materialist versions of panpsychism. 
I will now outline these points in more detail. The key difference between the 
views lie in whether or not things are observer-independent. Traditional western 
idealism, from Berkeley onwards, holds that to be is to be perceived (esse est percipi). 
Panpsychist idealism adds the further proviso that to be perceived is also to be a 
perceiver or perceivers (Harding, 1998, p. 55). In another sense of the term ‘idealism’, 
however, both versions of panpsychism can be considered idealist because all things 
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are broadly mind-dependent. For panpsychist idealism things depend upon 
consciousness because they are observer dependent, while for panpsychist materialism 
(particularly Russellian panpsychism) things are dependent upon consciousness 
because phenomenal properties are the intrinsic nature of things. I will reserve the label 
‘idealist’ only for views in which things are observer-dependent. 
The second key difference is the location of phenomenal properties. For 
idealism, phenomenal properties belong to fields of consciousness (subjects), while for 
materialist versions of panpsychism, phenomenal properties are the hidden inner nature 
of things. Loosely speaking, for the former things are in consciousness, while for the 
latter consciousness is in things. 
The third key difference is what entities figure predominantly in the ontology 
of the theories. Panpsychist idealism is subject-centred. In particular, reality consists of 
interacting networks of subjects. Space, time and physical processes all reduce to the 
properties and activities of these intersubjective networks. Panpsychist materialism is 
centred on objects, processes and causal structures. On a macro-scale, reality consists 
of interacting objects existing in objective space. On a micro-scale, reality consists in 
whatever current physics tells us, whether this be objects, fields, waves, or causal 
structures. The main difference of panpsychism from reductive materialism then, is that 
at least some of the physical fundaments have phenomenal properties. Some versions 
of panpsychist materialism will deny that subjects exist at all (Coleman, 2012, 2014). 
These key differences mean that the theories diverge significantly on some 
epistemic and metaphysical issues. In sections 4 and 5, I will argue that idealist versions 
of panpsychism generally fair better than materialist versions, particularly in 
accounting for colours and in dealing with the combination problem. Before this, in the 
next section, I will motivate the view using an argument from phenomenology and 
outline its advantages over Berkelean idealism and materialism. I will also respond to 
the objection that first-person centred approaches inevitably lead to solipsism. 
 
3. The Phenomenological Argument for Panpsychist Idealism 
 
A major point of difference between panpsychist idealism and panpsychist 
materialism is that the former holds that things are observer-dependent, while the latter 
rejects this. In this section, I will provide a motivation for the observer-dependence of 
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things and provide reasons why panpsychism could in principle be considered to 
provide a better explanation than its competitors for the regularity of the world.  
 
3.1. The Observer-Dependence of Objects 
 
In idealism things are observer-dependent. To understand this claim then we 
need to have an understanding of what an ‘observer’ is. By an observer, or a subject, I 
will mean a field of awareness.14 The reason for thinking that objects are observer-
dependent is that things always appear in a field of awareness. By ‘in’, I mean that 
things are subsumed by a field of awareness (a subject). Things are always a part of or 
an element of a field of awareness. 
As an illustration, consider visually experienced objects. Visually observed 
things, including my own body, always appear in my visual field. I have never 
encountered colours outside of my visual field. In fact, no one has ever observed colours 
outside of a visual field. For example, consider Figure 1. This figure visually depicts 
what it is was like for me to see the Grand Canyon. As can be seen, the vast expanse of 
the canyon and my visually experienced body both appear in my visual field. At the 
edges the field fades out, until there is visually nothing. Again, there is nothing sensorily 




14 Many contemporary philosophers are deflationists or even eliminativists about subjects (Coleman, 
2014; Dainton, 2008; Metzinger, 2003; Zahavi, 2011). For arguments against the deflation of subjects 
see (Albahari, 2006; Morris, 2017; Nesic, 2017; Nida-Rumelin, 2014; Ramm, 2017). Strawson (2009) 
holds an intermediate view in which the subject only exists synchronically but not diachronically, such 
that each moment is a new subject. For readers that hold that subjects are an illusion (or perhaps deny 
that there are multiple subjects), the term ‘perspectives’ can be used in place of ‘subjects’ and a version 
of panpsychism (or panperspectivism) will still follow. To deny that there are multiple perspectives is, 




Figure 1. Visual Experience at the Grand Canyon 
 
Of course, my first-person experience is not just visual, it is multi-modal. We 
investigate other senses in the following first-person experiment. 
 
The Closed Eye Experiment 
 
Please close your eyes and attend to your bodily sensations. How many toes do 
you have in your present experience? Are the feelings of a static, precisely 
shaped body that is felt all at once? Or are the sensations ever-changing and 
shapeless? Attend to your facial sensations, including its regions of warmth and 
tension. Do you feel a well-defined shape? Would you even know the contours 
of your face if you had never seen or touched it? Are you in a body on present 
evidence, or are these sensations in your awareness? Listen to the sounds of the 
room. Are your thoughts currently occurring in a head-box that separates it from 
these sounds? Or is there no dividing line between thoughts and sounds? Now 
try touching your head. Notice that you now feel the precise shape of your nose, 
cheeks and forehead. Notice also that you don’t feel your head all at once. As 
you touch your ears the feeling of your nose has faded. Are you in these touch 
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sensations? Do they box you in? Or are they also in your awareness? Do bodily 
sensations, thoughts and sounds occur in separate fields of experience, or are 
they occurring in a single awareness?15 
 
Whenever I encounter a thing it is in my field of experience, it is in awareness.  
Albahari (2009) calls this a ‘mode neutral awareness’, since it encompasses all sensory 
modalities. There is no empirical evidence that things can exist outside of a subject’s 
awareness.16 
All of the observational evidence that we have is that things always appear in a 
field of awareness. As an empiricist, Douglas Harding takes this setup as a model of 
the structure of reality in general.17 He holds that as a principle we should infer from 
the known to the unknown, rather than from the unknown to the unknown (Harding, 
1998, p. 210-211, 264). Since we know of no other manner in which things manifest, 
we can infer that things always manifest in consciousness. This inference is the safest 
bet because it does not involve any speculative metaphysical leaps.  
The strongest reason for holding that there are observer-independent objects, as 
suggested above, is that it provides the best explanation for the regularity of the world. 
Answering this reply is the second step of the argument for a panpsychist version of 
idealism. 
Suppose that I have a vase on the shelf of my study by the window. I leave the 
room and when I come back the vase is shattered on the floor. What happened? I know 
that it is a windy day, so it seems likely that a strong gust of wind blew the curtain into 
the vase which knocked if off of the shelf. This seems to be the best explanation, 
however, as no other observers were present this explanation is not available to 
subjective forms of idealism. For phenomenalists such as John Stuart Mill (1865), the 
continuity of objects is based upon a permanent possibility of experience. Since there 
was no one to observe this happen, all that that can be said is that there is now a 
disposition for the vase to appear broken on the floor. But this is a description of the 
new experience, not an explanation of it. The best explanation for the regularity of the 
 
15 For examples of the closed eye experiment see: Harding (2000, p. 56-60), Lang (2003, p. 35-38, 
2016, 41-48), Ramm (2017, p. 157-158). 
16 Strawson (2006, p. 20) makes similar remarks about the lack of evidence of any non-experiential 
reality.  
17 A similar phenomenological approach is taken by Ernst Mach (1890). 
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world seems to be (at least on the macro-level) that it operates in much the same fashion 
whether I am there to observe it or not. Hence there are mind-independent things.18 
This is a strong reason for rejecting subjective forms of idealism such as 
phenomenalism. However, the argument from regularity only provides a reason for 
holding that things continue to exist independently of my own mind, not that they exist 
independently of all minds, hence, objective forms of idealism remain in play such as 
Berkelean idealism in which God safeguards the regularity of the world by observing 
it when we are not. 
That God needs to exist to maintain the regularity and continuity of the world 
will already be enough for most philosophers to abandon idealism at this point. 
However, we do not need that the further subject be God. Rather it can be assumed that 
there are other subjects which are experiencing the events that led to the vase being 
shattered. In fact, for panpsychism the situation is redescribed as the evolving 
interaction of subjects which correspond to the wind particles, the curtain molecules, 
the vase molecules and the floor molecules. How the vase was shattered can then (at 
least in principle) be explained using entities from science, with the difference that the 
entities in the story are interacting conscious observers rather than mind-independent 
things. 
This theory is consistent with current scientific theories on cosmological and 
biological evolution. These processes do indeed occur without human observers; 








18 Bertrand Russell argues for the existence of mind-independent matter as the best explanation of the 
regularity of the world in chapter II of The Problems of Philosophy (Russell, 1912). He uses the 
example of a cat that gets hungry between meals. It if only exists when I am perceiving it, but not in the 
intervening interval (setting aside the cat’s experience of itself), there seems to be no reason why it 
would be hungry. Some of the many arguments against phenomenalism have been presented by David 
Armstrong (1961, chapters 5 and 6; 2004, p. 1-2). An anonymous reviewer pointed out that the 
existence of mind-independent things doesn’t explain the regularity of the world in as much as provide 
a background condition for there to be an explanation at all. In any case, as phenomenalism rejects 




3.2 Advantages over Berkelean Idealism 
 
In this section, I will argue that panpsychist idealism should be preferred to 
Berkelean versions of idealism. In Bishop Berkeley’s objective idealism things 
continue to exist because God is always observing them:19 
 
Sensible things cannot exist otherwise than in a mind or spirit. Whence I 
conclude, not that they have no real existence, but that, seeing they depend not 
on my thought, and have an existence distinct from being perceived by me, there 
must be some other Mind wherein they exist. As sure, therefore, as the sensible 
world really exists, so sure is there an infinite omnipresent Spirit who contains 
and supports it. (Berkeley, 1969, Second Dialogue, p. 75) 
 
Berkeley held that only God could play the role of the subject that safeguards 
the regularity of the world. Some might prefer the God hypothesis to panpsychism 
because panpsychism introduces numerous subjects in contrast to one infinite subject. 
However, panpsychism is superior to the God hypothesis for explaining the regularity 
of the world because I already know that at least one finite conscious perspective exists 
(my own), and have good reasons to think that there are many finite conscious 
perspectives (see my comments on solipsism below), whereas we have no independent 
evidence or strong reasons for thinking that an infinite subject exists. Occam’s razor 
applies to not multiplying types of entities without good cause, not to entities that are 
already known. Panpsychism is hence metaphysically simpler because it employs a type 
of subject that we already know exists to explain the world’s continuity. The God 
hypothesis is more metaphysically complex because it introduces a new type of entity, 
a transcendent infinite subject, to explain the continued existence of the world.20 
Berkeley’s argument that God needs to exist to explain the continuity of the 
world, is an inference to the best explanation and hence it is vulnerable to better 
explanations such as panpsychism. An alternative explanation to God is that things 
continue to exist without humans to experience them (or any other animals for that 
matter) because every concrete thing corresponds to a conscious perspective, or an 
 
19 Foster (2008) provides a recent defence of Berkelean idealism. Yetter-Chappell (2017) argues for a 
version of Berkeley’s idealism with a stripped-down notion of God. 
20 Philip Goff has also put forward a simplicity argument for panpsychism (Goff, 2017, p. 169-170). 
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aggregation of conscious perspectives. 21 In this way, the regularity of the world can 
arguably be explained using entities which we already know to exist, without the need 
to appeal to God.  
 
3.3 The Simplicity Argument Against Materialism 
 
The simplicity argument against Berkelean idealism can also be run against 
materialism. On the face of it, traditional materialism is metaphysically simpler than 
panpsychism. Inferring that cells, molecules and atoms are conscious just seems 
extravagant. Why are not non-conscious non-mental objects the best explanation for 
the regularity of the world? 
The short answer is that we do not have any observational evidence for the 
existence of mind-independent matter. How could we? All observations involve things 
appearing in a field of experience. As Bernado Kastrup puts it: ‘physically objective 
matter is not an observable fact, but a conceptual explanatory device abstracted from 
the patterns and regularities of observable facts – that is, an explanatory abstraction’ 
(Kastrup, 2019, p. 22). 
 Still, one may ask: if can we infer the existence of numerous experiencing 
subjects why isn’t it equally legitimate to infer the existence of non-mental objects? In 
answering this question, we can again draw upon the epistemic principle that inferring 
from the known to the unknown should be preferred over inferring from the unknown 
to the unknown (Harding, 1998). We know that at least one subject exists (ourselves), 
whereas we don’t know that any non-mental objects exist. The former inference is a 
case of empirical induction, while the latter is a case of metaphysical speculation. 
Panpsychism uses entities that we already know to exist to explain the world, while 
both Berkelean idealism and materialism posit empirically unknowable entities. 
Assuming then, that we do not need non-mental objects to explain the regularity of the 
world, panpsychist idealism is explanatorily simpler and more empirically-based and 
hence is a better explanation. The limitation of this argument is that it relies upon the 
conditional ‘if panpsychist idealism has equal explanatory power to materialism, then 
it is a better explanation’. The argument from simplicity is hence tempered by the fact 
 
21 Tables and rocks are usually assumed by the panpsychist to be associated with an aggregation of 
conscious perspectives, rather than having their own fully-fledged conscious perspectives (e.g., 
Harding, 1998, p. 119-120). 
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that it is still an open question whether all regularities described by physics can be 
explained by panpsychist idealism (i.e., at least as well as materialism), including 
space-time, causation, physical fields, quantum physics, and relativistic effects 
(Chalmers, 2019).  
 
3.4 The Threat of Solipsism 
 
The simplicity argument which I wielded against Berkelean idealism and 
materialism turns out to be a double-edged sword. If one should reject matter on the 
grounds of simplicity, then it seems that one should also reject the existence of others’ 
minds since these are also unobservable. This problem can be thought of as perhaps an 
almost inevitable outcome of using phenomenology as the primary guide to 
metaphysics. For example, both Descartes and Berkeley began from the first-person 
perspective and both were plagued by the problem of how to avoid solipsism (e.g., 
Henkel, 2012). Perhaps, this is one reason among many, that Cartesian-like approaches 
are so actively avoided and treated with suspicion by contemporary thinkers. 
However, this dismissal of first-person centred approaches is too quick. 
Phenomenological approaches have come a long way since Descartes and the British 
empiricists. In particular, more recent first-person approaches hold that experience is 
far richer in content than admitted by Descartes, Berkeley or Hume. According to the 
phenomenological and Gestalt traditions our experience of the world is not composed 
of atomic impressions, but rather of things and their properties (Kohler, 1947; Merleau-
Ponty, 1945). Moreover, the lived world is infused with meaning and value (e.g., 
Köhler, 1939). In particular, according to the phenomenological tradition the primary 
reason we believe in other minds is not inferential, but based upon pre-theoretical 
experience. We read the emotions in others’ faces, hear the distress in someone’s voice, 
see the intention in others’ actions (Gallagher & Zahavi 2013, Chapter 9; Merleau-
Ponty, 1945, p. 214) and experience objects as public (Husserl, 1960). This primordial 
experience, which the later Husserl refers to as the life-world already includes the 
perspectives of others implicit within it and our shared social and historical meanings 
(Husserl, 1970). Hence rather than thinking that an approach based upon first-person 
experience inevitably slides into solipsism, I believe that the opposite is true. Solipsism 
seems so perverse because it radically contradicts our first-person experience. Just as 
the fact that things always appear in consciousness provides prima facie evidence for 
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idealism, the meaning that infuses conscious experience that others have perspectives 
provides prima facie evidence for their minds. 
This response is not meant as a solution to the problem of other minds, but rather 
the goal is the more modest one of defending the phenomenological/simplicity 
argument for panpsychist idealism. There are also other motivations for holding this 
position as we will see. The metaphysical theory considered in itself, however, is 
decidedly anti-solipsistic. In this theory, a subject’s experience is composed of an array 
of the ‘outer’ side of numerous subjects impinging upon its consciousness.22 Subjects 
do not exist except by reflecting each other. That is, subjects are intersubjectively 
constituted and so solipsism is false by definition on this view. 
 
4. Phenomenological and Epistemological Drawbacks of Panpsychist Materialism 
 
In the previous section, I argued that panpsychist idealism has theoretical 
advantages over Berkelean idealism and materialism. Here I will argue that there are 
significant phenomenological and epistemological disadvantages for panpsychist 
materialism that arise by it assuming that experiences are the hidden properties of 
matter, that do not apply to idealism. 
 
41. Phenomenological Disadvantages of Panpsychist Materialism 
   
 A major difference between idealist and materialist versions of panpsychism is 
in where the views locate phenomenal properties. Here I will focus on colours. For 
panpsychist idealism colours are the properties of observed objects just as they 
appear. For example, the redness of a rose’s petals seems to qualify the rose’s petals. 
For panpsychist materialism, however, colours merely seem to be properties of 
objects. Roses are not actually red—they merely seem that way. Rather phenomenal 
properties of red are actually the property of something else—–e.g., brain states. This 
view has both phenomenological and epistemological drawbacks which do not apply 
to idealism. 
Materialist forms of panpsychism hold that the sensory qualities of human 
consciousness are instantiated in brains, while perceived physical things are outside in 
 
22 I am drawing on Albahari (2019, p. 38-39) for this way of articulating the position.  
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the external world. It hence establishes a spatial duality between sensory qualities and 
things in the world. As this view conflicts with how we experience the world, it commits 
perceptual experience to massive systematic error. Things are not really coloured rather 
colour is presumably projected ‘out there’ onto physical things. This is a kind of anti-
realism about colour in that it eliminates it from the ‘external’ physical world. Idealism 
on the other hand is realist about colour, and like naive realism accepts that things are 
as they appear. This result gives idealism a phenomenological advantage over 
panpsychist materialism. While this is not a knockdown argument for idealism, it is a 
theoretical virtue that panpsychist idealism has over its materialist competitor.23 
This argument can be extended by looking further at a point on which both 
idealist and non-idealist versions of panpsychism agree. My experience of the colour 
red strongly suggests that I experience something of its essential nature just by having 
the experience. In particular, our experience seems to reveal the essential nature of 
colours as non-relational properties (Goff, 2017, chapter 5; Nida-Rümelin, 2007). 
Colour is hence not really just a causal or functional property of the brain (or at least 
not apparently so). By making phenomenal properties the intrinsic properties of matter 
rather than reducing them to non-qualitative properties (e.g., functional states), 
panpsychism preserves our knowledge of our phenomenal experiences. 
Goff turns the intuition that experience reveals its essential nature into an 
argument against materialism (the Revelation Argument) (Goff, 2011, 2015, 2017, 
chapter 5; see also Nida-Rümelin, 2007). This argument is as follows: 
 
(1) Phenomenal red provides an essential characterization of its referent, phenomenal 
red. 
(2) Phenomenal red doesn’t provide a physical/functional characterization of 
phenomenal red. 
(3) If phenomenal red provides an essential but not a physical/functional 
characterization of phenomenal red then this property isn’t a physical/functional 
property. 
 
23 Barry Maund (2006) defends an illusory theory of colour and holds that although physical objects 
aren’t actually coloured it is sufficient for preserving our everyday linguistic practices that they 
systematically appear as if they were coloured. 
20 
 
(4) Hence, phenomenal red isn’t a physical/functional property.24 
 
Whether or not this argument succeeds, one of the challenges for panpsychist 
materialism is if introspection reveals the essential nature of colours, then what 
justification is there for ignoring the experiential fact that colours also apparently 
qualify things? In seeing the leaf, its greenness is not experienced as being in my head, 
but as qualifying the leaf. Colour is never presented as a sensory atom, but as spatially 
extended and located, in particular as a property of things.  
By contrast, idealism combines the strengths of both revelation and colour 
realism (Bryne and Hilbert, 2007). Idealism allows that I know the nature of colour and 
at the same time roses really are red. There is no need to revise the naïve concept of 
colour so that it means something else (e.g., surface reflectance, disjunctive properties). 
There is a complication for idealism though in that what we will mean by saying ‘the 
rose is red’ is that it appears red to particular observers in specific conditions. Other 
creatures and some humans won’t see the rose as red at all. In accepting colour realism, 
the idealist is only committed to the rose being coloured, not that it has a fixed context-
independent colour. For the idealist colours belong to things and hence there is no 
systematic error. Sensory qualities seem to be properties of things, and in fact they are, 
however, it also turns out that these things are mind-dependent.   
Although Bryne and Hilbert (2007) acknowledge the strengths of Berkeley’s 
colour realism, they go on to say that this unique combination of theoretical virtues is 
‘purchased at the rather steep price of idealism’ (p. 80). Usually, idealism about colours 
is reflexively discounted by philosophers because it is assumed that this requires giving 
up on scientific realism. However, as I have argued here, panpsychist idealism can 
preserve both scientific realism and colour realism.25  
 
 
24 This version of the argument is taken from Kelly Trogdon (2017, p. 2349). Trogdon provides a 
critique of the argument, but holds that it is works mostly strongly as a counter-response to the 
phenomenal concepts strategy.  
25 There are similarities between an idealist account of colours and the relationist account (Cohen, 
2004) in that both hold that colours depend upon conscious observers and vary by context and species. 
However, for the idealist, colours are ultimately non-relational properties of minds (Maund, 2006). At 
the same time idealism allows that colour is a property of objects themselves (since objects manifest in 
minds) and so has similarities to the naïve realist, also called the ‘simple’ or ‘primitivist’, view of 
colour (Campbell, 1994, 2005; Gert, 2008; McGinn, 1996; Watkins, 2005). Again, idealism presents an 
apparently promising hybrid of contemporary theories of colour that has not so far been explored by 
philosophers (for a review see Maund, 2019). 
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4.2 Epistemological Disadvantages of Panpsychist Materialism 
 
So far, I have outlined the phenomenological advantages of panpsychist 
idealism over panpsychist materialism. The view that colours (and all phenomenal 
qualities) are illusory also has epistemological drawbacks, particularly in conceiving of 
physical objects and knowing that they exist. 
According to idealists such as Berkeley colours that do not qualify things are 
mere abstractions—the artificial invention of philosophers. Since panpsychists, such as 
Philip Goff (2017), think that phenomenology should guide metaphysics, why not go 
the whole-hog to idealism and hold that colours are properties of observed objects and 
that things are always part of a field of consciousness? 
In response to this objection, in the context of discussing naïve realism, Goff 
argues that: 
 
When one goes through the process of Cartesian doubt—doubting the 
external world and then realizing that one cannot doubt the reality of one’s own 
experience—one immediately realizes that the properties one is aware of in 
experience are possibly separable, or at the very least conceivably separable, 
from the properties of the objects of experience. (Goff, 2017, p.114) 
 
Of course, a panpsychist idealist will agree that the tree I see does indeed exist 
when I am not perceiving it, but deny that it can exist without any observers whatsoever. 
When you take away all of its appearances to all observers, and hence all of its sensible 
qualities, there is nothing tree-like left of it.  Furthermore, there is nothing remaining 
or hardly anything remaining to the idea’s content. The inconceivability of physical 
objects without their sensible properties is in fact one of the most important of 
Berkeley’s arguments against materialism:  
 
Philonous: Try if you can frame the idea of any figure, abstracted from all 
particularities of size, or even from other sensible ideas. 
Hylas: Let me think a little–I do not find that I can… 
Philonous: Since it is impossible even for the mind to disunite the ideas of 
extension and motion from all other sensible qualities, doth it not follow, that 
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where the one exist there necessarily the other exist likewise? (Berkeley, 1965, 
First Dialogue, p. 157) 
 
Setting aside whether this shows that extension necessarily has sensible 
properties, let us try Berkeley’s exercise. Try for example imagining an invisible tree. 
If you are like me and can’t, then consider that matter without sensible properties is 
also like this. What is spatial extension, hardness or resistance without any visual or 
tactile experience? I have no idea. Berkeley has been criticised for confusing imagining 
and conceiving (Gallois, 1974). So perhaps I can conceive of the tree without any of its 
sensible qualities in a purely intellectual way. Suppose that I succeed in doing so; this 
purely abstract structure is surely not what we mean by concrete objects. If these 
possibilities are correct then either: (1) we cannot conceive of an object outside of 
experiencing it, or (2) if we can it is so vague that the concept is virtually empty, or (3) 
it is so abstract that it cannot count as what we mean by a concrete object. No doubt 
there are counter responses to this argument, but I hope to have at least shown that 
conceiving of concrete objects outside of experience is not as straightforward as it first 
seems.26 
A second epistemological drawback for panpsychist materialism is that if the 
colours that I see apparently qualifying things are illusory, then it is difficult to maintain 
that I see mind-independent things at all. Related to the points above, this is because 
colour and shape are given together in experience as a single unity. Suppose I am 
looking at a green leaf. I see the shape in virtue of its spatially extended colour. But if 
colour is merely subjective then the shape that I see is also merely subjective (Fish, 
2009, p. 44; Smith, 2010, p. 389; Millar, 2015, p. 612-613). Hence, I arguably do not 
see a mind-independent leaf at all on this view.  
If the leaf’s colour is subjective, then it seems that the perceived shape is also 
subjective. Hence there is now a veil of perception between myself and the mind-
independent world. This puts panpsychist materialism in a position similar to sense data 
theories (Huemer, 2019, section 3.2). Responses have of course been be made to this 
problem. For instance, perceptual experiences may represent objects (Jackson, 1977). 
Hence objects can be experienced indirectly, that it is via one’s perceptual experiences. 
 
26 For recent versions of the argument that matter is not positively conceivable see Foster (1982), 
Sprigge (1983), and Robinson (2009). Holden (2019) provides evidence that Berkeley held that the 
concept of physical objects apart from experience is either vacuous or contradictory. 
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Idealism and naïve realism, however, have the intuitive advantage of allowing that we 
directly perceive objects as they are without any intermediary representations.27 For 
idealism, as objects are constituted by their appearances to subjects, there is no 
epistemic gap between experiencing the object and it actually existing, and between 
seeming to manipulate an object and actually manipulating it.  
 
5. The Subject Combination Problem 
 
The arguments I have given for panpsychist idealism are neutral as to what 
particular form this should take, in particular whether it should be a constitutive, 
emergent28 or cosmic idealist.29 However, in the rest of the paper I will confine my 
comments to the subject combination problem for constitutive micro-panpsychism. 
This is the thesis that macro-experience is wholly or partially grounded in micro-
experience (Chalmers, 2016). In particular, our conscious experience is constituted 
from the experiences of numerous micro-subjects. There are many versions of the 
combination problem, though the subject combination problem is arguably the hardest 
(Chalmers, 2016). This is the problem of explaining how micro-subjects combine 
together to constitute macro-subjects. If this cannot be explained, then panpsychism has 
its own explanatory gap, analogous to materialism.  
I hold that taking a first-person approach to subjects can illuminate why the 
subject combination problem is so difficult for panpsychist materialism. David 
Chalmers (2019) argues that because micro-idealism has less properties to work with 
than panpsychist materialism (i.e., fundamental physical properties), the combination 
problem is more difficult for the former than the latter. By contrast, I hold that the 
reverse is in fact true. 
 
27 For phenomenological arguments for naïve realism against representationalism see Brewer (2011), 
Campbell in Campbell and Cassam (2014), Kennedy (2009), Martin (2002). For arguments against the 
naïve realist account of experience, particularly of illusions and hallucinations, see Millar (2015), 
Ramm (2020), Robinson (2013). 
28 Emergent micro-panpsychism is the thesis that macro-experiences strongly emerge from micro-
experiences. That is, this theory denies that macro-experiences are wholly grounded in micro-
experiences (Chalmers, 2016). For emergentist versions of panpsychism see Brüntrup (2016), (Klinge, 
2020), Mørch (2014), Rosenberg (2004).   
29 Cosmic idealism can be divided into whether individual subjects are grounded in a perspectival 
cosmic subject (Kastrup, 2019) or an aperspectival universal consciousness (Albahari, 2019, 2020; 
Shani and Keppler, 2018).   
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My claim is that the subject combination problem is intimately tied to a key 
assumption of materialism—phenomenal experiences are hidden properties of matter. 
As this assumption is not made by idealism, the combination problem, or least the 
intuitive case for it, does not seem to apply. The problem is not solved as such, rather 
it is arguably shown that it rests on a conceptual mistake. 
In a well-known expression of the subject combination problem William James 
uses an analogy of the failure to combine macro-subjects: 
 
Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to each one 
word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each think 
of his word as intently as he will; nowhere will there be a consciousness of the 
whole sentence. (James, 1890, Chapter 6, p.160) 
 
That no combination will occur in this case seems rather obvious. James’ way of 
thinking about the combination problem is also illustrated by what Sam Coleman 
(2012) calls the ‘Block/Stoljar Problem’. Coleman relates a story found in Block (1980, 
p. 280) and Stoljar (2006, p. 120) about tiny aliens which for their own mysterious 
reasons decide to exactly replicate fundamental particles with their ships. Their ships’ 
activities even combine to produce physical substances exactly like carbon, oxygen and 
so forth. At some point humans colonize the aliens’ area of the galaxy. After a number 
of years of ingesting the aliens through growing and eating crops and breathing them 
in, we become totally physically constituted by the alien pseudo-particles. It is obvious 
from the story that the micro-experiences of the aliens in the spaceships will not 
compose to form our macro-experiences. The story hence arguably shows that 
constitutive panpsychism is false. 
 There are at least two possible lessons to take from James’ and the Block/Stoljar 
examples. I will put the possibilities in terms of James’ example: 
 
1. We can conceive of twelve men thinking a word combining together and there not 
being a consciousness of the sentence (a failure of subject combination). 
2. We cannot conceive of twelve men thinking a word and for there to be consciousness 




The first version of the problem denies that subject combination will necessarily occur. 
This is a negative argument. The second version denies that subject combination is 
possible at all, this is a positive argument against subject combination.   
The first version of the combination problem has been endorsed by Philip Goff 
(2009). He argues that we can conceive of micro-experiential zombies, that is, 
organisms composed of conscious fundamental particles, but in which there is no 
macro-experience. This shows that there is no a priori necessary link between the 
micro-experiential truths and the macro-experiential truths. This argument can be 
written out formally as follows: 
 
1. Micro-experiential zombies are conceivable. 
2. If micro-experiential zombies are conceivable, they are metaphysically 
possible. 
3. If micro-experiential zombies are metaphysically possible, then constitutive 
panpsychism is false. 
4. Therefore constitutive panpsychism is false. 30 
 
The problem with the zombie thought experiment is that it makes two 
unwarranted assumptions: (1) that phenomenal properties are instantiated in things and 
(2) that subjects are a kind of object or thing in space. From an idealist perspective, the 
zombie argument fails because it is simply the wrong way to think about consciousness, 
that is, it commits a category error. 
Zombies are inevitably entities as seen from the third-person perspective. 
Subjects, on the other hand, are essentially first-personal. The error lies in trying to 
imagine subjects merging (or failing to merge) from the third-person perspective as if 
consciousness was a ghostly presence inside people and other things. By rejecting the 
assumption that consciousness is a hidden property of things, one of the intuitive 
foundations of the subject combination problem is removed. First-person experience 
shows, I claim, that a subject is the field in which things manifest, not one of the things 
in that field. This reply doesn’t answer the question of how subjects combine, but it 
does arguably block the conclusion that panpsychism is false by denying the premise 
that micro-experiential zombies are conceivable. This defence is of small consolation 
 
30 The form of this argument is based upon Chalmers (2016) and Goff (2009). 
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for the Russellian panpsychist and related materialist views as it only works by denying 
their central assumption that consciousness is a property of matter. What it does 
arguably show however is that subject combination is not ruled out for idealism. 
The second version of the subject combination problem is the claim that subject 
combination is just plain incoherent. This objection is forcibly argued by Sam Coleman 
(2014). Coleman analyses the problematic assumption of panpsychists as being that 
experiences belong to subjects. Subjects’ experiences are necessarily private and closed 
off from one another. Their experiences cannot mix with that of other subjects, and so 
them combining to create a further subject is simply incoherent. 
Like James, Coleman seems to be treating subjects as though they can be 
understood from the third-person perspective, and hence combined as though they were 
objects in space, like bricks being put together to build a wall. Coleman makes this 
assumption vivid when he asks us to imagine the lives of separate subjects: 
 
Imagine a hundred qualitatively identical subjects at the ‘starting line’ of 
existence—their only difference is that they occupy distinct positions in space– 
time. They are about to set out on their lives. As time winds on, each takes a 
unique path through the environment, and is impinged upon differently. These 
different impingings result in different modifications of each sensory field. Thus 
each subjectival perspective has access to a qualitatively different array of 
qualia, as compared with other subjects, over its lifetime. 
 
This understanding of subjects reinforces the notion that subjects’ experiences 
are necessarily private (Coleman, 2014, p. 35). However, if what I have argued here is 
correct, then this is simply the wrong way to think about consciousness. For the idealist, 
subjects are not in trapped in things and so their experiences are not private in virtue of 
being physically bounded. Neither are subjects in space and so there is no reason to 
think of them as individuated by occupying different spatial locations. This at least 
suggests that the principle that subjects’ experiences are necessarily private need not be 
a feature of idealism. 
Another way to resist the conclusion that subject combination is incoherent is 
to provide a positive example of combination. What does subject combination look like 
for an idealist? Illuminating suggestions can be found in Douglas Harding’s chapter 
14.9 ‘The Compounding of Consciousness’ (Harding, 1998).  
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Harding’s approach suggests that we should give up on trying to imagine 
subjects from the third-person perspective. From the first-person perspective, I am not 
an object in the world, but rather the unbounded space31 in which the world is currently 
being presented. This space has no personally identifying characteristics, hence the only 
difference between my friend and I are the objects we are consciousness of. Harding 
takes this to imply that when we experience the same object, our minds overlap. When 
we are in the same room, we see the same walls and the same chair. He argues that this 
provides a clue to conceiving of the fusion of subjects: 
 
The means of this compounding are ready to hand: you and I are the same in so 
far as we make way for the same object. Our two heads are better than one 
because when we put them together they are one—one no-head, one room—
and the emptiness in our heads is infinitely fusible. For when I see what you 
see… I am you: since (so far as I can discover) neither of us has anything of his 
own with which to keep out the other. (Harding, 1952, p. 154) 
 
One problem with this example is that we see things from different angles and 
so our experience of them will differ slightly. However, if we think of the experience 
in term of objects rather than phenomenal properties, it is conceivable that we overlap 
in consciousness in virtue of having the same object in consciousness. There will be 
differences in perspective between subjects (lighting, distance, angle etc.) but the object 
of consciousness itself will be numerically identical (at least on the face of it). The 
contents of consciousness need not be, at least arguably, exactly the same for subjects 
to overlap.  
Still it may be held that there is at least a strong prima facie case for the privacy 
of mental states and hence for holding subjects cannot combine or overlap. I cannot 
directly know others’ thoughts or feelings and they cannot know mine. This is 
especially vivid for pain states. Whilst, this is highly intuitive, it does not follow that 
none of our experiences overlap, especially perceptual experiences. When we are both 
viewing the sky from the same spot why not say that the very same blue expanse is 
present in both of our perspectives? In fact, some of our experiences may well overlap 
without us knowing that this is the case, hence giving rise to an illusion of absolute 
 
31 By ‘space’ I do not mean the space of physics, but rather a capacity for things to appear in. 
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privacy. A further example in support of the possibility of overlap is conjoint twins that 
share parts of their brains. There seems to be no reason why my conjoint twin could not 
experience very the same token of pain as me. Hence my twin could be a distinct subject 
(they have experiences and cognitive states that I don’t have), without being a discrete 
subject (Roelofs, 2016).32 
It is illustrative to contrast James’s example of failed fusion with Harding’s 
positive example of fusion. James is correct in observing that heads and their contents 
cannot be combined by jamming them together. If thoughts are in heads then there is 
no reason to think that they can be combined, in fact, it seems obvious that they cannot 
be. By contrast, from the first-person perspective, as a kind of unbounded non-personal 
gap, there seems to be no reason why I could not combine with other unbounded non-
personal gaps. Once we stop thinking of subjects as analogous to things in space, then 
there is little (or at least even less) reason for assuming that they are atomic substances 
that cannot combine.  
The space from which I am looking is like a hole and this hence suggests that 
the combination of subjects, if it does happen, should be thought of along the lines of 
the combination of holes. Imagine two circular holes in a piece of fabric side by side. 
Now imagine these holes growing larger and larger until their boundaries merge. They 
instantly become a single hole as soon as their boundaries are breached. Holes have no 
intrinsic particularities and hence when they are brought together, they merge perfectly. 
In fact, it is inconceivable that two holes could merge without becoming one. Here we 
arguably have a necessary form of fusion and a positive means of imagining the 
combination of subjects.  
This would be a transparent form of conceiving of subject summing, in contrast 
to an opaque (mysterian) account such Goff’s (2017b) phenomenal bonding solution. 
Goff conceives of phenomenal bonding as the relation between subjects ‘such that when 
subjects stand in it they produce a further subject’ (Goff, 2017b, p. 293). The current 
example, on the other hand, is of two subjects fusing into one rather than producing a 
third subject.33   
 
32 Roelofs (2016, p. 3209) distinguishes between strong privacy and weak privacy. ‘Strong Privacy: A 
single experience cannot be directly known by multiple distinct subjects. Weak Privacy: A single 
experience cannot be directly known by multiple discrete subjects.’ The point here is weak privacy is 
compatible with experience sharing, even if strong privacy is not.  
33 A further move available to the emergent panpsychist idealistic is to draw upon Hedda Hassel 
Mørch’s (2014) account of subject fusion to avoid the causal exclusion problem. For a discussion and 
critique see Goff (2017a, p. 156-157). Sam Coleman (2014) denies that fusion is a form of 
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Goff (2017b) thinks that since we cannot experience more than one subject at a 
time (i.e., we only experience ourselves) we cannot experience such a relation between 
them. Hence, we have no positive conception of it. By contrast, Douglas Harding uses 
the everyday example of two subjects looking at the same object from the same angle 
as a prima facie case of perspectives already overlapping and beginning to fuse into 
one. We generally assume in everyday life that when we look at the same object as 
someone else, we are experiencing numerically the same object. To assume instead that 
there are two different copies of the object in two discrete fields of consciousness is to 
beg the question by assuming that subjects are atomistic. Of course, all of the conditions 
in which subjects will and will not combine still need to be filled in, but at least 
combination would be prima facie possible. 
 In particular if subjects’ experiences are not closed off from each other, there 
seems to be no reason why parts of their overall experiences could not also form the 
experience of an entirely new subject. Take for example the smell of roast beef for one 
subject, the feeling of being cold of a second subject, and the feeling of tiredness of a 
third subject (Goff 2009). These experiences may be phenomenally and numerically 
identical in a fourth subject that partially overlaps with these subjects.  Once subjects 
are allowed to partially overlap, the variety of potential hybrid subjects is unlimited. 
There are however limits to the above analogy. The holes that we are imagining 
are in space and have spatial boundaries. Gaps and holes are between and in things 
(they are bounded by things), whereas what I am looking out of is not apparently in 
anything or bounded by anything. In this sense, the term ‘gap’ does not apply. 
Furthermore, on a purely idealist system, such as being considered here, subjects and 
networks of subjects are not in space, spatial properties are in them. 
I do not take myself to have solved the combination problem which comes in 
many varieties (Chalmers, 2016). I do suggest though that thinking about subjects from 
the third-person point of view is the entirely wrong-headed starting point (pun 
intended). A positive account of subject combination first requires that we know what 
it is like to be a subject, and subjects are not seemingly objects in the world. 
 
 
‘combination’ because combination entails that the micro-subjects survive the process of combining. In 
any case, he goes onto argue that fusion of subjects also doesn’t help because subjects are essentially 
discrete (Coleman, 2014, p. 35), however, this is the one of the assumptions about subjects that has 





In this paper, I outlined motivations for idealist panpsychism, drawing on the 
empirical fact that things always appear in a field of consciousness. I argued that 
panpsychism is explanatorily simpler and more empirically based than positing a God 
or non-mental objects. I also argued that panpsychist idealism has phenomenological 
and epistemological advantages over panpsychist materialism. Finally, I made the case 
that the combination problem itself has been motivated by the problematic assumption 
that consciousness is in things. Thinking about subject combination from the first-
person perspective by contrast is fruitful for re-framing the subject combination 
problem and for seeing how subjects could potentially combine for the idealist. I have 
only been able to sketch some reasons in favour of panpsychist idealism here. There 
are many outstanding details that would need to be elaborated in a full theory. However, 
the hope is that these considerations show that panpsychist idealism is well worth 
further investigation. It may in fact be better placed than panpsychist materialism to 
explain how consciousness fits into the physical world—or better yet, how the physical 
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